Smith v. Berg by unknown
2001 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-13-2001 
Smith v. Berg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001 
Recommended Citation 
"Smith v. Berg" (2001). 2001 Decisions. 76. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/76 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed April 13, 2001 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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SMITH, individually; VALISE C. MATTHEWS, individually, 
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated 
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FIRST TOWN MORTGAGE CORPORATION; 
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NATIONAL FINANCIAL, through its subsidiary, Fidelity 
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FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
       Columbia National Incorporated, First Town 
       Mortgage Corporation; Countrywide Credit 
       Industries, Inc.; Fidelity National Title 
       Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 
       Appellants 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 99-CV-02133) 
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr . 
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Before: MANSMANN, BARRY and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case presents two questions: First, in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Salinas v. United States, 552 
U.S. 52 (1997), may liability under the federal Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") 
 
conspiracy statute codified at 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d) be limited 
to those who would, on successful completion of the 
scheme, have participated in the operation or management 
of a corrupt enterprise? Second, did the Supr eme Court's 
more recent decision in Beck v. Prupis , 529 U.S. 494 
 
(2000), limit application of its holding in Salinas to criminal 
cases? Ruling against the Appellants on both issues, we will 
affirm the Orders of the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. In doing so, we hold that any 
reading of United States v. Antar, 53 F .3d 568 (3d Cir. 
1995), to the effect that conspiracy liability under section 
1962(d) extends only to those who have conspir ed 
personally to operate or manage the corrupt enterprise, or 
otherwise suggesting that conspiracy liability is limited to 
 
those also liable, on successful completion of the scheme, 
for a substantive violation under section 1962(c), is 
inconsistent with the broad application of general 
conspiracy law to section 1962(d) as set forth in Salinas. 
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I. 
 
In this putative class action brought in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, the Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendant, John G. Berg ("Berg"), acting through corporate 
entities, misled them into purchasing homes which they 
could not afford by fraudulently asserting that their homes 
would be entitled to various tax abatements and mortgage 
credit certificates.1 The Plaintiffs further allege that the 
Defendant title insurance and lending companies 2 
("Appellants") conspired with Ber g to defraud the Plaintiffs 
and realize the maximum profits fr om the sales and related 
title insurance and financings. Specifically, they allege that 
the Appellants conspired to further Ber g's fraudulent 
enterprise by allowing Berg to assume many of their normal 
functions during settlements, recording false information 
on HUD-1 Settlement Statements, contacting pr ospective 
home buyers and encouraging them to make the 
purchases, communicating and negotiating with Berg 
rather than directly with the Plaintiffs, failing to make 
Truth-In-Lending Law disclosures, and granting mortgages 
for which they knew the Plaintiffs wer e unqualified. 
Accordingly, the Complaint asserts claims against the 
Appellants for participation in a RICO conspiracy with Berg 
in violation 18 U.S.C. S 1962(d). 
 
The District Court first denied the Appellants' motion to 
dismiss these claims by its Memorandum Opinion of April 
10, 2000, rejecting the Appellants' argument that the 
claims failed as a matter of law because the Appellants' 
conduct was not alleged to violate section 1962(c). 3 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Plaintiffs allege that in furtherance of his scheme, Berg used 
misleading mailings and radio and television advertisements. His 
fraudulent enterprise allegedly encompassed at least nine residential 
developments in Philadelphia from 1994 to 1997. 
2. The additional defendants are Columbia National, Inc.; First Town 
Mortgage Corporation; Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc.; Fidelity 
National Financial; and Fidelity National Title Insurance Company of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
3. The Plaintiffs do not allege that the Appellants committed any of the 
predicate acts or operated or managed, or agr eed personally to operate 
or manage, the enterprise. Rather, the Plaintiffs only allege that the 
Appellants agreed with Berg to the violation of section 1962(c) and took 
certain overt acts in furtherance of that agr eement. See April 10, 2000 
Mem. Op. at 6. 
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District Court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997), and concluded 
that it implicitly overruled our prior holding in United 
States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568 (3d Cir . 1995) and that, in 
accordance with Salinas, liability under section 1962(d) is 
met by "1) knowledge of the corrupt enterprise's activities 
and 2) agreement to facilitate those activities."4 The District 
Court concluded these elements were sufficiently pled. 
 
Shortly thereafter, on April 26, 2000, the District Court 
requested briefing from the parties on the import of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Beck v. Prupis , 529 U.S. 494 
(2000).5 The District Court expr essed concern that the 
Supreme Court's statement in Beck that"injury caused by 
an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or otherwise 
wrongful under RICO . . . is not sufficient to give rise to a 
cause of action under S 1964(c) for a violation of S1962(d)" 
might require dismissal of the conspiracy claims.6 On 
consideration, however, the District Court concluded that 
Beck did not affect the Plaintiffs' claims in this case 
because they, unlike Beck, allege direct injury as a result 
of the racketeering. See July 7, 2000 Mem. Op. at 5-6. 
 
The District Court certified its decisions for immediate 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) on July 7, 2000 
and we granted the Appellants' Petition on September 26, 
2000. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. April 10, 2000 Mem. Op. at 7 (citing Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66). Salinas 
involved a deputy who had knowledge of, and facilitated, a bribery 
scheme where an inmate paid off a sherif f for "contact visits" with his 
wife and girlfriend. The jury acquitted Salinas of liability under section 
1962(c) because he had not committed any predicate acts, but convicted 
him of conspiracy because of his agreement to the scheme and his 
assistance therein. 
 
5. The decision in Beck was handed down that very day. 
 
6. Mr. Beck, the CEO of an insurance company, was terminated after 
discovering that certain of the company's dir ectors and officers were 
engaged in racketeering. The Supreme Court r ejected his theory that 
S 1964(c) provided a cause of action because his injury -- termination of 
employment -- was done in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy. See 
529 U.S. 498-499. 
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II. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1962(c) provides: 
 
       It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or 
       associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the 
       activities of which affect, interstate or for eign 
       commerce, to conduct or participate, dir ectly or 
       indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs 
       through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection 
       of unlawful debt. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1962(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful to 
conspire to violate [S 1962(c)]." 
 
As the District Court observed, the starting point for our 
analysis is the Supreme Court's decision in Reves v. Ernst 
& Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993). In Reves, the Court held 
that to be liable under section 1962(c), a person must 
participate in the "operation or management" of the corrupt 
enterprise's affairs. Id. at 179. In Antar, we considered a 
line of cases holding that conspiracy liability does not 
require a showing that the defendant himself participated 
in the operation or management of the enterprise. W e 
considered these cases to be in tension with Reves, at least 
if read broadly. In an attempt to r esolve this perceived 
tension, we crafted a novel distinction "between, on the one 
hand, conspiring to operate or manage an enterprise, and, 
on the other hand, conspiring with someone who is 
operating or managing the enterprise." 53 F .3d at 581 
(emphasis added). We concluded that liability under section 
1962(d) would attach only in the first instance because only 
then is the defendant conspiring to do something for which 
he would, if successful, be liable under section 1962(c). Id. 
 
This language in Antar was unnecessary to our holding, 
as our Opinion in this conspiracy withdrawal case 
concluded, in effect, that the defendant met either standard.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See 53 F.3d at 581. See also G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, 
Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on 
Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under 
RICO, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1504 (Spec. Ed. 1996) (describing 
Antar as "unfortunately offer[ing] misguided dicta on the scope of RICO 
conspiracy"). 
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In addition, the majority of our sister Courts of Appeals 
presented with the same question have not applied the 
"operation or management" test set forth in Reves to a 
RICO conspiracy. They have instead concluded that"Reves 
addressed only the extent of conduct or participation 
necessary to violate a substantive provision of the statute; 
the holding in that case did not address the principles of 
conspiracy law undergirding S 1962(d)."8 
 
The question then is whether the language of Antar is 
dispositive, requiring dismissal of the conspiracy counts or 
whether, as the District Court concluded, it was vitiated by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Salinas. In Salinas, the 
defendant was charged with criminal violations of both 
section 1962(c) and section 1962(d) but convicted on the 
conspiracy charge alone. The Supreme Court resolved a 
conflict among the Courts of Appeals, finding-- as had the 
majority of our sister Courts of Appeals -- that a RICO 
conspiracy defendant need not himself commit or agr ee to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F .3d 1469, 1484-85 (7th Cir. 1993), 
accord United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied 517 U.S. 1111 (1996). See also United States v. Posada-Rios, 
158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998); Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 
683-84 (2d Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has been the only other Circuit 
to suggest that the Reves test applies to a RICO conspiracy. See Neibel 
v. Trans World Assurance Co., 108 F .3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 
See also Blakey, Reflections on Reves, 33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 1513- 
14: 
 
       Reves is not a conspiracy decision; its holding focuses solely on 
       what is required to violate S 1962(c) as a principle in the first 
degree. 
       Reves says nothing about the scope of S 1962(d). The issue in 
Antar, 
       however, was how to read S 1962(d), not how to read Reves . . . . 
       Reading S 1962(d) was a question to be answer ed by reading [it] 
       against the background of general conspiracy jurisprudence, as 
       modified, if at all, by the text of RICO. . . . Antar's dicta that 
limits 
       the scope of conspiracy under RICO making RICO conspiracy 
       jurisprudence more narrow than general conspiracy jurisprudence 
       . . . cannot be squared with basic techniques of statutory 
       interpretation, much less with the purpose of RICO, which sought to 
       broaden, not narrow the law, its plain text, its liberal 
construction 
       clause, or well-established RICO jurisprudence and the developing 
       post-Reves RICO conspiracy jurisprudence in other circuits. 
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commit predicate acts. In upholding the r esult in the 
Salinas case, the Supreme Court found that a violation of 
section 1962(c) was not a prerequisite to a violation of 
section 1962(d). Rather, the Court found that for purposes 
of conspiracy it "suffices that [defendant] adopt the goal of 
furthering or facilitating the criminal behavior ." 522 U.S. at 
65.9 Moreover, the Supreme Court provided an extensive 
discussion indicating that RICO's conspiracy section-- 
section 1962(d) -- is to be interpreted in light of the 
common law of criminal conspiracy and that all that is 
necessary for such a conspiracy is that the conspirators 
share a common purpose.10 
 
Thus, as the District Court observed, Salinas  makes 
"clear that S 1962(c) liability is not a pr erequisite to 
S 1962(d) liability." April 10, 2000 Mem. Op. at 7. The plain 
implication of the standard set forth in Salinas is that one 
who opts into or participates in a conspiracy is liable for 
the acts of his co-conspirators which violate section 1962(c) 
even if the defendant did not personally agr ee to do, or to 
conspire with respect to, any particular element.11 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.  A conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if 
       completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive 
       criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of 
furthering 
       or facilitating the criminal endeavor. He may do so in any number 
       of ways short of agreeing to undertake all of the acts necessary 
for 
       the crime's completion. One can be a conspirator by agreeing to 
       facilitate only some of the acts leading to the substantive 
offense. 
 
522 U.S. at 65. 
 
10. See id. at 64 ("If conspirators have a plan which calls for some 
conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide support, the 
supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators . . . so long as they share a 
common purpose, conspirators are liable for the acts of their co- 
conspirators."). 
 
11. The Appellants' principal response to the prospect of conspiracy 
liability in accordance with Salinas is that this definition of conspiracy 
would impose liability on those who "merely provide services". This 
phrase masks the fact that liability will arise only from services which 
were purposefully and knowingly directed at facilitating a criminal 
pattern of racketeering activity. If the Appellants' repeated 
characterization of themselves as innocent service providers is not belied 
by the evidence, they will incur no liability under section 1962(d). 
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Appellants' assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
Supreme Court did not confine its discussion in Salinas to 
the element of predicate acts, in which event it might be 
"harmonized" with Antar's discussion of requirements as to 
levels of participation; rather, the Court expressed its 
analysis in broad terms, defining an interpretation of 
conspiracy liability directly at odds with Defendants' 
reading of Antar.12 We therefore hold that any reading of 
Antar suggesting a stricter standard of liability under 
section 1962(d) is inconsistent with the broad application of 
general conspiracy law set forth in Salinas. In accord with 
the general principles of criminal conspiracy law, a 
defendant may be held liable for conspiracy to violate 
section 1962(c) if he knowingly agrees to facilitate a scheme 
which includes the operation or management of a RICO 
enterprise. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Appellants rely heavily on the Seventh Circuit's recent decision 
in Brouwer v. Raffensperger, 199 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2000), toassert that 
predicate acts and levels of participation should be analyzed separately 
in determining liability under section 1962(d). The Appellants urge us to 
hold that the broad standard set forth in Salinas is limited to the former 
element and that the stricter standard suggested in Antar governs with 
regard to levels of participation. Sali 
              nas cannot be read so narrowly. See 
Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857 (concluding"that the better-reasoned rule" 
is one which does not import the Reves test into a RICO conspiracy 
claim, "especially in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
[Salinas]" which held "that S 1962(d) is governed by traditional 
conspiracy law"); Baker v. Stewart Title & Trust, 5 P.3d 249, 258 (Ct. 
App. Ariz. 2000) (observing that Salinas"supports the rule adopted by 
the majority of circuit courts that a person need not participate in the 
enterprise's operation or management to be liable for a RICO 
conspiracy"). Cf. Beck, 529 U.S. 501 n.6 (describing Salinas as defining 
"what constitutes a violation of S 1962(d)", rather than a violation of 
one 
sub-element of (d)). 
 
We also note that, at least in the pr esent context, application of the 
separate framework proposed in Brouwer would not alter the result. At 
bottom, the Court in Brouwer held that a conspirator must simply agree 
to "knowingly facilitate the activities of the operators or managers to 
whom subsection (c) applies." 199 F.3d at 967. The allegations in the 
case before us are sufficient to meet this requirement. 
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III. 
 
As noted above, Beck involved a CEO whose employment 
was terminated when he discovered that certain of his 
company's officers and directors were engaged in 
racketeering. In rejecting the theory that this injury -- one 
"caused by an overt act that [was] not an act of 
racketeering or otherwise wrongful under RICO" -- was 
"sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under S 1964(c) 
for a violation of S 1962(d)", the Supr eme Court expressly 
refuted the assertion that this interpr etation rendered the 
conspiracy statute "mere surplusage." 529 U.S. at 506-507. 
The Court specifically noted that, to the contrary, "a 
plaintiff could, through a S 1964(c) suit for violation of 
1962(d), sue co-conspirators who might not themselves 
have violated one of the substantive provisions of S 1962." 
Id. 
 
Furthermore, although the Appellants assert that Beck 
restricts Salinas to criminal cases, the only mention of 
Salinas appears at footnote 6, in which the Supr eme Court 
recites that "[w]e have turned to the common law of 
criminal conspiracy to define what constitutes a violation of 
S 1962(d)". 529 U.S. 501 n.6. The r eference to Salinas does 
not in any way repudiate its holding about what constitutes 
a conspiracy violation or indicate that the violation is 
different in a civil context. To the contrary, the footnote 
observes that Beck "does not present simply the question of 
what constitutes a violation of S 1962(d), but rather the 
meaning of a civil cause of action for private injury by 
reason of such a violation." Id. The plain import of this 
passage is that the question of what constitutes a violation 
of section 1962(d) continues to be defined under and 
governed by Salinas. It is a r eaffirmance.13 
 
The holding of Beck is that an injury sufficient to support 
a civil action under section 1964(c) must arise out of 
wrongful conduct proscribed by the substantive provisions 
of section 1962 (i.e., in the context of a section 1962(c) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Although the Appellants attempt to characterize Beck as 
circumscribing liability, the decision actually limits the class of 
plaintiffs 
whose injuries are cognizable; it does not in any way limit the class of 
defendants who are liable. Beck is simply a lack of standing case. 
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violation, the injury must arise out of the pr edicate acts).14 
As the District Court correctly concluded, the Plaintiffs' 
claims in this case stem from injury dir ectly attributable to 
Berg's racketeering; they are the dir ect victims of 
substantive RICO violations.15 Thus the Appellants remain 
subject to liability under the reasoning enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Beck. See July 7, 2000 Mem. Op. at 6 
(noting that "civil conspiracy often is not considered a 
separate cause of action, but rather a `mechanism for 
subjecting co-conspirators to liability when one of their 
member committed a tortious act' ") (quoting Beck, 529 U.S. 
503). 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the Orders 
of the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. This holding addressed a split in the Courts of Appeals as to whether 
an employee discharged for discovering, or blowing the whistle on, a 
RICO scheme could bring suit under section 1962(d). The Courts of 
Appeals had consistently held that there was no direct liability under 
section 1962(c) because the injury suffer ed was not a result of the 
predicate acts underlying the RICO violation, but were divided as to 
liability under section 1962(d). 
 
15. See System Management Inc. v. Loiselle , 112 F. Supp. 112, 119 (D. 
Mass. 2000) (rejecting defendant's argument for dismissal premised on 
Beck where plaintiffs were "direct victims" of the alleged fraud). 
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